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COGNITIVE SELF-ENHANCEMENT AS A DUTY TO
ONESELF: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE
Katharina Bauer
ABSTRACT: Recently some bioethicists and neuroscientists have argued for an impera-
tive of chemical cognitive enhancement. This imperative is usually based on conse-
quentialist grounds. In this paper, the topic of cognitive self-enhancement is
discussed from a Kantian point of view in order to shed new light on the contro-
versial debate. With Kant, it is an imperfect duty to oneself to strive for perfecting
one’s own natural and moral capacities beyond one’s natural condition, but there
is no duty to enhance others. A Kantian approach does not directly lead to a duty
of chemical cognitive self-enhancement, but it also does not clearly rule out that
this type of enhancement can be an appropriate means to the end of self-
improvement. This paper shows the benefits of a Kantian view, which offers a con-
sistent ideal of self-perfection and teaches us a lesson about the crucial relevance of
the attitude that underlies one’s striving for cognitive self-improvement: the lesson
of treating oneself as an end in itself and not as mere means to the end of better
output.
1. ENHANCE YOURSELF!
Most people try to improve themselves in one way or another—they
want to become more intelligent, more successful, more beautiful. And
(hopefully) they also strive to become better friends, parents, citizens,
and moral agents. In spite of on-going debates about the risks and
moral concerns that are related to modern techniques of human
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enhancement,1 some bioethicists and neuroscientists argue that enhance-
ments are not only permissible but should be regarded as an obligation
for various reasons. They presuppose a general moral imperative of
enhancement in order to improve the life of individual human beings or
a more specific imperative to use chemical cognitive or emotional
enhancers in order to contribute more efficiently to the goods and goals
of a group or of society. Such imperatives of self-enhancement are usu-
ally based on consequentialist grounds. I will discuss the topic of cogni-
tive self-enhancement—in particular the use of smart drugs in
academia—from a Kantian point of view. Apart from few exceptions it
is quite unusual to use Kantian arguments in this field of applied
ethics.2 But Kant’s theory offers new perspectives and helpful tools for
analyzing the pros and cons and the moral status of cognitive self-
enhancement in a surprisingly open-minded manner. With Kant, I will
argue that there are good reasons to regard it as an imperfect duty to
oneself—but not toward others—to advance one’s own nature, personal-
ity, and moral perfection on the basis of critical self-reflection. And I
will investigate what a Kantian approach can teach us about the appro-
priate means, the moral limitations, and the right reasons for self-
enhancement.
After a short introduction into the practice of using smart drugs in
academia and the risks that are related to chemical cognitive enhancement
(section 2), I will briefly present recent positions that argue more or less
explicitly for an obligation to enhance oneself (section 3). I will discuss the
idea of a duty to enhance others (section 4) and point out the benefits of
Kant’s alternative understanding of self-improvement as a duty to oneself. It
does not directly lead to a duty of chemical cognitive self-enhancement, but
it also does not clearly rule out that this type of enhancement can be an
appropriate means to the end of self-improvement (section 5). Nevertheless,
a Kantian approach places limits on the use of such means (section 6). I will
1 In this paper, enhancement is understood as an additional improvement beyond an
already existing good quality. According to this definition, any kind of education aims at
enhancement, but I will focus on methods of chemical cognitive enhancement. I accept the
common distinction between therapy as the curing or restoring of dysfunctions and enhancement,
which starts from a “normal” functioning in order to improve it (cf. Harris 2004, 44).
However, there are probably borderline cases in which it is difficult to say whether the per-
formance of a healthy or “normal” student is enhanced by the medication or whether a
learning disorder is treated successfully.
2 For a general discussion about the applicability of Kantian ethics see Altman 2011. I
agree with Altman’s presupposition that “Kant’s philosophy deeply informs our moral think-
ing, so examining his approach to various topics in applied ethics will help us to reflect on
and evaluate our own positions” (7). Few authors explicitly refer to Kant in discussing forms
of enhancement (e.g., Gunderson 2007 and Meyers 2014).
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not conclude that the Kantian view provides answers to all the open ques-
tions of current debates about cognitive enhancement. But it offers a consis-
tent ideal of self-perfection and teaches us the lesson of treating oneself as an
end in itself and not as mere means to the end of better output (section 7).
2. SMART DRUGS IN ACADEMIA: JUST LIKE DRINKING
COFFEE?
It is reported that Kant drank a lot of coffee during his work. Surely, such a
biographical note cannot serve as a serious philosophical argument, but it
gives us a first hint at the fact that Kant may have showed sympathy for the
idea of enhancing his mental capacities by using chemical substances. Of
course, Kant’s theory does not tell us anything about modern chemical
enhancers. But in his Metaphysics of Morals he offers us a short but interesting
passage about wine, spirits, and opium. Kant argues harshly against the use
of drugs as far as they reduce intellectual capacities and make people act like
animals or “cattle” and not like human beings. He introduces a negative per-
fect duty to oneself that is directed against “Stupefying Oneself by the
Excessive Use of Food or Drink” (MM VI 427f).3 However, he asks whether
a modest consumption of wine could be allowed for socializing or increasing
one’s virtues—in particular at the occasion of a banquet which is “a formal
invitation to excess in both food and drink” to Kant’s regret, but at the same
time it has “a moral end” as “it brings a number of people together for a
long time to converse with one another” (MM VI 428).4 In this passage,
Kant very cautiously shows some agreement to the idea of using drugs as a
means to a certain end—as long as it is a moral end.
Cognitive capacities are essential for moral improvement from a Kantian
point of view. They are needed for any particular kind of development of
one’s talents as well as for sober rational reflection about one’s maxims and
ends. Understanding and applying the categorical imperative requires con-
siderable cognitive efforts. With Kant, modern methods of chemical cogni-
tive enhancement could thus be at least justified as contributions to one’s
moral enhancement.5 Still, one can actually presume that in scholarship and
research chemical cognitive enhancement is usually not directly related to
3 Kant’s works are cited according to the standard pagination of the Berlin Academy
edition [Akademieausgabe].
4 It is surely open to discussion why and in so far this is a moral end in particular accord-
ing to Kant’s own understanding of morality. However, this question goes beyond the scope
of this paper.
5 For a more detailed discussion about the possibilities and problems of different forms of
moral enhancement and its relation to cognitive enhancement, see Focquaert and Schermer
2015.
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moral ends. It is used with the intention to improve one’s research, to learn
more, to learn more efficiently, to improve one’s results, or to gain competi-
tive advantage.
So called “smart drugs” that are used for academic purposes have mem-
ory- and focus-boosting effects. They help persons to concentrate more effi-
ciently on their work, even if a topic bores them, or they just help to keep
them awake in order to prolong their overall working time. The risks of the
use of CNS stimulants that were originally developed as treatments of
ADHD, narcolepsy, and Alzheimer’s, like Modafinil, Adderall, and Ritalin
(Methyl-phenidates), as well as Ampakines, are often regarded as rather low.
They do not easily cause physical addiction, even though they can clearly
cause psychological addiction. And they can lead to a severe lack of sleep,
which is dangerous for one’s physical and psychological health. Nevertheless,
it can be said that the scope of the positive and negative effects of the most
common smart drugs does not really differ fundamentally from the conse-
quences of harmless and well-established methods of cognitive enhance-
ment—including biochemical methods like drinking coffee. Indeed, for
many students and researchers the use of smart drugs is “just like drinking
coffee.”6 They do not regard the higher degree of the effect of those
enhancers as morally significant.
However, some studies suggest that the short-term advantage of improv-
ing one’s cognitive performance has potentially high costs in the long run as
it may reduce brain plasticity. A loss of plasticity can change a person’s emo-
tional setting and promote anxiety as well as “behavioral rigidity,” and it can
“potentially damage WM [working memory], logical thinking and decision
making” (Urban and Gao 2014, 5). The focus on a concentrated short-term
performance could probably diminish the capacity to plan ahead and to mul-
titask. Some students report the individual experience of a loss of creativity
and a loss of interest in non-work-related activities like social activities. The
risk that short-term enhancement of particular cognitive capacities could be
successful at the expense of long-term side effects that diminish the same or
other important cognitive capacities is highly relevant for discussing the ques-
tion whether chemical enhancements offer the right means to enhance one-
self as a student or researcher. This also depends on which mental capacities
should be enhanced. What is the right proportion between being focused
and concentrated or open-minded and creative? Which kind of knowledge
6 See the following reports: Deutsche Welle, “Smart Drugs: Generation Self-Optimization.”
Written by Caroline Schmitt. Last modified October 2014. http://dw.com/p/1DdmQ; Times
Higher Education, “Pills Provide Brain Boost for Academics.” Last modified June 2007.
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/pills-provide-brain-boost-for-academics/209480.
article.
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shall the enhanced student acquire—preferably broad or specialized knowl-
edge? It remains open to discussion how to interpret the ideal of the perfect
student or researcher. This hints at the relevance of a much more fundamen-
tal question: Which self would count as an “optimized,” “perfected,” or
“enhanced self”? And what does it actually mean to “enhance” oneself?
Even though Kant is well aware of the fact that nobody is perfect, because
human beings are not merely noumenal and reasonable, he introduces a
clearly developed ideal of “one’s own perfection” [eigene Vollkommenheit] (MM
VI 386f and 446). A perfect person would be perfectly reasonable and auton-
omous. She would set ends for herself in accordance with the moral law. In
fulfilling her moral duties, she would always act from duty. Her only motive
for acting morally would thus be correspondence to the moral law and it
would not be contaminated or outperformed by any other motives like striv-
ing for pleasure or happiness. The ideal person would be able to govern her
unsettled and contingent desires perfectly. For Kant, complete perfection
cannot be completely realized by a single human being, but nevertheless
each human being ought to strive after this ideal in order to contribute to the
improvement of humanity.
As we will see later, Kant clearly holds the view that human beings ought
to improve themselves beyond their natural disposition. Does that imply that
they should make use of any available technological or biomedical means
and developments of self-enhancement? The discussion about biomedical
enhancement often refers to a difference between means of self-improvement
“such as exercise” which are “considered natural and virtuous” and others
that are “perceived as artificial” (de Grazia 2005, 206). Nevertheless, if it
would be possible to develop smart drugs without any side effects, their use
could probably be perfectly normal—just like drinking coffee or like the use
of “artificial” means like glasses or binoculars to improve or enhance one’s
visual capacity (cf. Harris 2007, 19). It will probably become more and more
normal to use chemical cognitive enhancers in the near future (cf. Bostrom
and Sandberg 2009, 330). However, this does not automatically imply that it
should be the norm. From a Kantian point of view, a reference to social con-
ventions does not offer a sound normative argument. As the Kantian human
being shall exceed its nature, the difference between natural and artificial
means cannot be a decisive argument. When Kant deals with concrete meth-
ods of personal improvement he usually refers to rather classical methods of
education.7 But Kant could have endorsed methods like genetic engineering
7 He does so in his Methodology of Pure Practical Reason, in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic
Point of View, as well as in his lectures on education. For a detailed discussion of Kant’s theory
of education, see Roth and Surprenant 2012.
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insofar as they can supplement education as well as “the cultivation of under-
standing and morally beneficial character traits” and contribute to a fulfill-
ment of one’s duty to oneself to seek perfection (Gunderson 2007, 88f). Let
us now have a look at other arguments that are presented in favor of a norm
or even imperative of chemical cognitive enhancement.
3. A MORAL OBLIGATION?
In a 2009 paper about cognitive enhancement Bostrom and Sandberg sug-
gest developing “a culture of enhancement” (333). They ask why students
should not be “positively encouraged to take performance enhancers (assuming
they are sufficiently safe and efficacious) for the same reasons that they are
encouraged to take notes and to start revising early” (328). They point out
that the social force to enhance one’s cognitive capacities is just equivalent to
forcing literacy upon citizens of modern societies or to other measures of the
educational system (ibid.). And they argue that some forms of cognitive
enhancement can even contribute to a better development of autonomy “by
enabling one to base choices on more deeply considered beliefs about unique
circumstances, personal style, ideals, and the options available” (327). Hence,
they suppose that there could be “a special obligation to help some incompe-
tent subjects become competent agents capable of autonomous reasoning”
(324) by means of cognitive enhancement.8
In an interview, Sandberg argues that self-enhancement shall not be
regarded as cheating, because
competition is a zero-sum game: if one person uses enhancers, others have to do so
too in order to have a chance. But in many jobs and higher education the actual
situation is a positive-sum game: if we perform well, the group performs better. . . .
The important part of universities is after all learning and thinking, and we want
more and better learning and thinking.” (Deutsche Welle 2014b)
From this point of view, the use of enhancers in academia is not only fair, it
is a desirable contribution to the most essential task of the academic world.
When Sandberg refers to the positive sum of better learning and thinking, he
obviously introduces a consequentialist argument. He votes for the positive-
sum game in favor of the highest utility for the group.
Does that lead to an obligation to optimize our individual faculties in
order to contribute more efficiently to the performance of the group and to
the goal of “more and better learning and thinking”? Or does it even lead to
a more general obligation to enhance yourself in order to enhance your
8 I will discuss this argument in more detail in section 3.
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contribution to a better society, a better world or to the (highest) good?
Some authors regard it as a professional duty to enhance particular capabili-
ties in order to fulfill a particular function—like doing the work of a surgeon
or a pilot9 or the work of a judge.10 Others argue that human beings should
be morally enhanced in order to make sure that they do not misuse technolo-
gies and destroy their environment.11 Bioethicist John Harris actually
recommends regarding enhancements in general as a moral obligation as
“there are moral reasons . . . to confer and not withhold even small benefits”
for human beings (Harris 2009, 131). The overall goal that he presupposes is
a healthy and long life without harm and suffering. He argues that parents
should support the enhancement of their children (also by “buying educa-
tional privilege,” Harris 2007, 27) and that “those of us who are autonomous
enough to consider such questions, have good reasons to confer such benefits
on ourselves” (Harris 2009, 132). It is one of Harris’ main arguments in
defense of enhancement that the difference between therapy and enhance-
ment is usually overestimated. If human beings are always characterized by
their natural deficiency, any kind of improvement turns into a therapy that
corresponds to the moral imperative of preventing harm. This argument is
transferable to an obligation to help “some incompetent subjects” (see above)
in enhancing their autonomy and their capacities. As they are regarded as
incompetent and deficient, this also blurs the differences between therapy
and enhancement. And if a fundamental incompetence and deficiency is
attributed to human nature as such, which is regarded as “a work-in-
progress, a half-baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable
ways” (Bostrom 2005, 4), this implies that we ought to remold ourselves as
human beings or even transform ourselves into “transhuman” beings in
order to prevent harm and confer benefit for humanity.
It sounds compelling to derive a moral obligation to enhance human
beings from the aim of a better life. But the normative conclusion that “the
morally justifiable enhancements owe their moral justification to the fact that
they make lives better” (Harris 2009, 154) requires discussing what exactly
makes a life better or worse. Is it the individual wellbeing of a person, the
moral quality of her actions, or the contribution to a higher good, like the
9 For an overview see Santoni De Sio et al. 2014. Goold and Maslen (2014) discuss
whether chemical cognitive enhancement could be imposed on surgeons as a legal duty.
10 See Sandberg et al. 2011. Chandler and Dodek (2016) discuss whether judges have an
ethical obligation to use enhancements and whether their enhanced decision making would
conflict with the views of the unenhanced public.
11 The main proponents of this argument are Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu
(2008; 2011; and 2013). The argument for moral enhancement in order to prevent climate
change has also been defended by Matthew Liao, Anders Sandberg, and Rebecca Roach
(2012).
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outcome of better learning and thinking for our society and culture? And it
has to be discussed whether an obligation to improve oneself implies a duty
to enhance others.
4. A DUTY TO ENHANCE OTHERS?
If an obligation to enhance oneself would be regarded as a duty in the strict
sense, this could mean that others have a corresponding right to implement
enhancement on someone—for example, on their own children. And if there
was a right to live in a better world of better learning and thinking and a
moral obligation to contribute to the overall improvement of this world, then
this could lead to the idea that it was legitimate to institutionalize the imple-
mentation of cognitive enhancement—for example, by means of compulsory
schooling as well as by means of incentivized programs for encouraging the
use of chemical cognitive enhancers12 or even by introducing a legal duty.
The principle that everyone should optimize himself in order to contribute
to the high and unassailable goal of better learning and thinking sounds very
attractive (at least to academics who obviously share this goal). However, if a
duty of self-optimization gives others the right to urge persons to optimize
themselves in favor of the performance of a group by means of social pres-
sure, institutional interventions, or other influences like nudging, then the
consequentialist interpretation of a normative principle of perfectionism
opens the doors to many kinds of paternalism. Imagine a group of students
who have to fulfill a task or write a thesis together. Those who take smart
drugs in order to achieve a better result together can put strong social pres-
sure on those who refuse to do so. They could blame them for hampering
the optimal realization of the joint project. An institutionalized form of stipu-
lating the use of smart drugs has a long tradition in the military, in particular
for pilots. And in the view of those who favor a general enhancement of all
the members of a society those who do not see a necessity to use particular
means of enhancement can easily be regarded as incompetent minors who
need to be necessitated with parental authority to take the newest and most
extensive means of self-enhancement.
There is always a narrow ridge between assisting others in increasing their
autonomy and reducing their autonomy through paternalist intervention—
in the peculiar tradition of forcing persons to be free (cf. Trachtenberg
2012). In principle, taking the maxim of fostering an agent’s capacities in
order to enable him to make his own autonomous decisions in the future is
compatible with Kant as it means to respect the agent as a potentially
12 Sarah Carter convincingly argues against the introduction of such incentives (2015).
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autonomous agent. However, for Kant it is most important to respect the
other person as an end in herself and never to use her as a mere means to an
end. More precisely one ought to respect the humanity in the person—in
terms of her rational nature and her capacity of setting ends independently
from her natural inclinations. Even if the fellow students or military pilots
are respected as being competent in a specific area they are obviously used
as a means to an end of a group. Still, it does not follow from this automati-
cally that they are treated as mere means and not respected as ends in them-
selves. The reason why one decides to assist the other to enhance his human
capacities can be based on respect, but it can also be based exclusively on the
presupposition that one needs the enhanced version of the other as a useful
instrument for realizing one’s own ends or the ends of a group. Using a per-
son—or, more precisely, the humanity in a person—merely as means can be
defined as regarding and actively using her as an instrument in the service of
reaching an end, without at the same time respecting her as an end in itself
and without attaching importance to her consent. So it is also decisive here
whether and to what extent the other really freely consents to using the
method of enhancement or whether he rather gives in to pressure.
I would now like to suggest a Kantian way of thinking that allows us to
keep the idealist imperative of self-improvement without accepting the conse-
quences of social pressure or paternalistic interventions that could force indi-
viduals to use all available means to optimize themselves. Most of all this
Kantian view is directed against the consequence that individual persons
(learners) are treated or treat themselves as mere means to a common goal
(the end of better learning). In order to understand this way of thinking let us
now have a closer look at Kant’s understanding of self-enhancement as a
duty to oneself.
5. “MAKE YOURSELF MORE PERFECT”—AN IMPERFECT DUTY
TO ONESELF
In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces the imperative “Make yourself more
perfect than mere nature has made you” (MM VI 419). According to Kant,
persons have duties to themselves13—and not toward others—to preserve their
own nature and to advance their personality and moral perfection beyond
13 It is not self-evident that persons can have duties to themselves, but Kant defends those
duties as the precondition for any duties to others (cf. MM VI 417f). The human being “can
be put under obligation and, indeed, under obligation to himself (to the humanity in his own
person)” (ibid.). There is an ongoing discussion about the possibility of such duties. To name
just two exemplary contributions to that discussion, I would like to hint at Denis 1997 and
Timmermann 2006.
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the conditions of their nature on the basis of critical self-reflection. I would
like to underline two benefits of regarding self-improvement as a duty to one-
self that can be extrapolated from a Kantian approach, which are relevant
for discussing methods of chemical cognitive enhancement:
(1) A person cannot and ought not be necessitated by others to fulfill a duty that is
a duty to herself. She owes her efforts of self-improvement to herself—respective to
humanity in herself—but not to others. There is no duty to promote other’s moral
perfection according to Kant. So there is no good reason for paternalistic attempts
to enforce methods of self-enhancement.
(2) There is latitude as to how exactly and to what extent the duty shall be satisfied
in concrete actions and comportments. And there is latitude in the choice of spe-
cific ends (cf. Wood 2002, 168). Within the framework of rational end-setting,
every person is free to decide which of her natural capacities she would like to
develop, to what extent she is going to do so, and, especially, what means she is
ready to use to improve her natural, mental, and moral capacities. It is thus not jus-
tified to establish a strict moral obligation, that is, a perfect duty to use enhancers
in order to optimize one’s capacities and output—either in academia or as a profes-
sional duty in other fields that were mentioned above.
(1) It is possible to support methods of chemical cognitive enhancement from
a Kantian point of view, if they improve and do not reduce our intellectual
capacities and if and only if they improve and do not reduce the person’s
capacity to set her own ends. Hence, any risk of physical or psychological
addiction can provoke a serious objection against the use of smart drugs.
Addiction restricts the free choice of ends, because it imposes a certain end
on the agent and perpetuates it—the end of satisfying the addiction. The
same concern about one’s freedom of end-setting applies to social pressure
or performance pressure and—as Kant is a strong antipaternalist (cf.
Gunderson 2007, 97)—even more to institutional coercion that pushes peo-
ple to self-enhancement. As Gunderson summarizes:
Kant claims that the perfection of a person is the ability to set one’s ends in accord
with one’s conception of duty . . . it follows that we cannot have a duty to seek the
perfection of another person because only that person can set his or her own ends.
(89)
One can hint at somebody the idea that self-perfection is an attractive goal,
or one can make somebody aware of a particular ideal of human perfection.
However, only the respective person can adopt the end as her own end. As
setting oneself one’s own ends in accordance with one’s conception of duty is
an essential element of the Kantian ideal of self-perfection—as well as of his
conceptions of humanity and human dignity—it would be a logical contra-
diction to make a person set her own ends toward self-perfection. As a result,
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that person would finally miss the end of self-perfection. That is precisely
why choosing the end of improving oneself as a person has to be understood
as a duty to oneself. According to Kant, it would not make sense to introduce a
duty of promoting the moral perfection of others. However, Lara Denis asks
whether it is really logical that Kant denies this duty with an ought-implies-
can argument, as he also knows that one cannot really perfect oneself, but he
still argues that one ought to try it. She suggests introducing a wide duty to
oneself of choosing the end to perfect others as far as they consent and also
make their self-perfection their own end (cf. Denis 2001). This argument is
comprehensible, however, the duty to others would then be a duty to assist
them in their own attempts of improving themselves, according to their own
free choice and according to their own ends. It can only follow after setting
oneself the end of self-perfection, thus after the realization of the duty to one-
self to adopt the maxim of striving for self-improvement.
(2) For Kant, a person owes it to herself to cultivate her natural talents
and her moral capacity in terms of a “wide and imperfect duty” (MM VI
[note], 444 and 446). Perfect duties are strict and narrow; imperfect duties
allow for latitude “about that kind and extend of actions” (MM VI 446) that
are, for example, undertaken to perfect one’s natural capacities. However, it
is most important that “a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make
exceptions to the maxim of actions” (MM VI 390). For Kant, it does not
make sense to introduce a perfect duty of perfecting one’s natural disposi-
tions that would prescribe concrete actions, because “no rational principle
prescribes specifically how far one should go in cultivating one’s capacities
(. . . in acquiring knowledge or skill)” (MM VI 392). He underlines that it is
up to the individual who strives for self-improvement which natural talents to
develop in which proportion. A human being should “choose [this] in accor-
dance with his own rational reflection about what sort of life he would like to
lead” (MM VI 445). And even the duty to cultivate one’s morality, which is
most important for Kant, is only a wide duty because “a human being can-
not see into the depths of his own heart so as to be quite certain, in even a
single action, of the purity of his moral intention” (MM VI 392), which is the
decisive criterion of Kantian morality. So it is an imperfect duty toward oneself
to choose the maxim of striving for self-perfection. This means that with Kant
there is no duty to choose particular means to that end. And there is no good
reason to argue for an obligation—for a perfect duty—that would stipulate
the action of using cognitive chemical enhancers or other means of enhance-
ment, even if a specific form of enhancement contributes to a desirable goal
or if it could save the world because it could prevent negative consequences,
like climate change (cf. Person and Savulescu, 2012). It can only be regarded
as a wide duty to take the decision and choose the maxim of pursuing the
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enhancement of one’s talents and improving one’s morality. This is a duty of
virtue and not a duty of right, which means that it is not enforced by
“external constraint” but based on “free self-constraint” (AA VI 383).
But why do persons have to constrain themselves at all? Why do they have
to put the duty on themselves to make themselves more perfect? Kant pre-
supposes that human beings have a natural disposition toward self-
cultivation, self-moralization, and self-civilization. Nevertheless, there is no
automatism that guarantees the unfolding of these dispositions, because
other dispositions and personal desires can impede their realization. How-
ever, persons are also essentially characterized by their capacities of commit-
ting themselves to overcoming these inner obstacles by imposing a
corresponding duty on themselves. For Kant there is no duty to oneself to
promote one’s own welfare or happiness—or only in so far as this belongs to
the necessary means to avoid temptations and to act morally (cf. MM VI
388).14 If good results or an academic career just correspond to someone’s
self-interest because they make him happy and fulfill his individual desires,
these goals are not the right candidates to establish a duty to oneself. There
is simply no need to establish a duty of better learning and thinking if some-
one already pursues these goals as contributions to his own happiness. A
moral duty makes us independent from what we actually desire. It does not
matter for Kant if we want better learning and thinking, or a healthier or lon-
ger or happier life, or if someone wants to be successful student and desires
to gain that success as effortlessly as possible. It matters whether we should
rationally will that end and whether we should therefore commit ourselves
(as beings who are not purely rational) to these goals.
Kant presupposes that any “rational being . . . necessarily wills that all the
capacities in him be developed, since they serve him and are given to him for
all sorts of possible purposes” (G IV 423). According to Robert Johnson, one
of the decisive failures in conforming to this duty of self-improvement consists
in being a “one-Dimensional person: She only aims to develop a capacity
absolutely necessary to succeed at a single narrowly construed undertaking”
(Johnson 2007, 142). One could ask whether Kant would really condemn a
one-dimensional concentration on moral issues or on developing the talents
of a moral philosopher. And as Kant’s ideal of self-perfection implies
“cultivating one’s faculties . . . the highest of which is understanding” (MM
VI 387), it is most essential to develop one’s cognitive capacities. The capacities
of better learning and thinking serve human beings for all sorts of possible
purposes. The fundamental principle of all duties to oneself is to know and
examine yourself, because you have to know the maxims on which you act in
14 For a controversial discussion see Denis 1999 and 2001.
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order to act morally. In Kant’s own words you ought to “know your heart—
whether it is good or evil” and to gain “moral cognition of [your]self” (ibid.).
The fundamental duty to oneself is being an innate judge of one’s actions,
thus making use of one’s conscience (cf. MM VI 438). As stated above, Kant
obviously presupposes a profound and sophisticated activity of thinking about
oneself and one’s motives, actions, and their legitimacy that is crucial to
advance one’s moral perfection. If chemical cognitive enhancers clearly
improve these activities of thinking and moral cognition, there would be
good reasons to use them as means to better fulfill the duty to oneself to strive
for self-perfection.
Is chemical cognitive enhancement compatible with the rational will
of improving one’s talents most completely? Finite beings cannot opti-
mize all their capacities and talents. They always have to face a trade-off
between different options of improving themselves. And the option of
improving one’s general cognitive capacities is obviously attractive within
a Kantian framework. However, in the light of the discussion about pos-
sible effects and side effects of smart drugs, it does not seem clear
whether chemical cognitive enhancers help to extend the scope of talents
that can unfold within a limited timespan or whether they enforce a ten-
dency toward being focused on only one goal and activity and, thus, a
tendency toward one-dimensionality. If a method of chemical cognitive
enhancement fosters one-sidedness because it leads to a restricted focus
on one’s work, a loss of interest in other activities, a loss of creativity, or
a loss of brain plasticity, this would restrict the unfolding of all the
capacities of a person.
But most of all, the maxim behind the decision to use a technique of self-
enhancement is decisive: if a person is taking smart drugs with the one-sided
prudential maxim to learn what is absolutely necessary for passing an exami-
nation and getting a good grade, and if she does not consider which further
aspects of learning would help her to advance a more complete and, particu-
larly, a moral self-development, this would be a failure and an infringement
against the Kantian duty to oneself to strive for perfection—or at least a
severe misunderstanding of that duty.
After all, the imperfect duty to oneself to adopt the maxim of striving
for self-perfection does not lead to the duty to act on that maxim by
means of chemical cognitive enhancement. Still, this does not imply that
using these means could not be an appropriate and legitimate way of
enforcing one’s self-improvement from a Kantian point of view. As
stated above, Kant’s moral philosophy is not incompatible with modern
methods of self-enhancement, but it also places limits on the use of such
methods.
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6. LIMITS THAT ARE PLACED ON ENHANCEMENT
WITH KANT
So far the risk of addiction as well as a possible fostering of one-sidedness
have been pointed out as side effects of chemical cognitive enhancement that
are problematic from a Kantian perspective. I will now take up the three
sorts of limits that Gunderson distinguishes with regard to genetic engineer-
ing in order to discuss the limits that Kant’s moral philosophy places on the
use of certain methods of enhancement more systematically. These limits
concern (1) the risk of “undermining humanity,” (2) the problem of
“unjustifiable risks,” and (3) the drawback of a restriction on “competitive
advantage” (Gunderson 2007, 92f.).
(1) The risk of undermining humanity has a specific relevance in cases of
genetic engineering or cybernetics. Such methods of enhancement entail
much stronger and more permanent interventions into someone’s personality
or nature than chemical cognitive enhancement.15 With Kant the highest
risk of undermining one’s own humanity is the risk of treating oneself merely
as means to an end instead of respecting oneself at the same time as an end
in itself and thus as a person. I will come back to the relation of that risk to a
particular attitude toward oneself and to self-respect in the last section.
Furthermore, one could argue that any influence on a person’s autonomy
in the strict Kantian sense, as well as in a broader sense of being free to
decide which sort of life you would like to lead, could undermine the human-
ity in a person. A Kantian position must give special consideration to any
concerns about autonomy, which are generally important for questions of
enhancement: Is the choice of a method of self-enhancement “sufficiently
voluntary” with regard to “the social forces” that may have influenced the
decision (de Grazia 2005, 221)? Does a student or researcher mainly react to
peer pressure or to time and performance pressure? Or is it his own autono-
mous and elaborated decision to use a particular technique of enhancement?
Realizing one’s autonomy, one’s capacities of being reasonable and corre-
sponding to morality are the main goals of any kind of self-improvement of
human beings and ought not to be risked by the side effects of the means
that are used or by the way in which the decision to use those means is
formed or influenced. As Timmons points out, “one way in which one can
15 There are strong concerns that through the use of such means of self-enhancement
“we risk ‘turning into someone else’, confounding the identity we have acquired through nat-
ural gift cultivated by genuinely lived experiences” (The President’s Council on Bioethics
2003, 300). With regard to our example we could ask: Is the enhanced person the same per-
son, if a lazy, slow, and uninterested student suddenly turned into an eager beaver after he
had used smart drugs?
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fail to respect his or her own humanity is to destroy or cause serious damage
to those rational powers that constitute one’s end-setting capacity” (2017,
192). With Kant the rational powers that distinguish human beings from ani-
mals constitute the capacity to set moral ends for oneself. However, one can
also argue that the human person is characterized by a broader manner of
developing her capacities and setting herself ends (cf. Johnson 2011). So far it
is questionable to what extent smart drugs really help individuals to “base
choices on more deeply considered beliefs” (see above) and foster their per-
sonal autonomy and an unfolding of their end-setting capacities or whether
they rather foster a tunnel vision in pursuing particular objectives. A long-
term loss of brain plasticity or long-term damage of cognitive capacities
could definitively “cause serious damage to those rational powers that consti-
tute one’s end-setting capacity.”
The Kantian ideal of the perfect person that is “worthy of the humanity
that dwells within him”—the humanity “by which alone he is capable of
setting himself ends” (MM VI 387)—is limiting the use of means of
self-enhancement. However, with regard to the concrete question, whether a
student or researcher should take smart drugs in order to improve his learn-
ing and thinking, if this is his own decision, corresponds to his own ends, and
does not undermine his self-respect as a person, the concrete limits that are
placed by this ideal depend on the risks and side effects.
(2) Does Kant’s theory offer a clear answer to concerns about unjustifiable
risks and side effects of enhancement methods? In his system of duties, the
perfect duties to oneself with regard to one’s animal nature are directed
toward self-preservation. Persons have to care for their health and physical
fitness. They ought not mutilate themselves, which cannot only be under-
stood materially in terms of “depriving oneself of certain integral, organic
parts,” but also formally in terms of “depriving oneself (permanently or tempo-
rarily) of one’s capacity for the natural (and so indirectly for the moral) use of
one’s powers” (MM VI 421). Thus, severe physical side effects of enhancers
as well as the involved risks to reduce any of one’s capacities immediately or
in the long run have to be avoided. As self-preservation is a perfect duty to
oneself, the negative duty not to self-harm one’s animal nature is overriding
the imperfect duty of self-improvement in Kant’s system of duties. The fact
that Kant expresses his disapproval of the vaccination against smallpox may
be interpreted as a strong resistance against any risks and side effects of medi-
cal treatment. However, Kant was convinced that the vaccination entailed
the risk of putting one’s life in danger. Actually, it was a risky “inoculation
with human smallpox (variolation) and not the vaccination with the less viru-
lent cowpox” at that time (Unna 2003, 465). There is an ultimate limit of
any risk-taking for Kant, which is “the categorical prohibition of self-
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destruction” (462). Self-preservation is a duty to oneself because it is the nec-
essary condition for any striving for self-perfection and for realizing and opti-
mizing one’s rational and moral capacities. Fulfilling the imperfect duty of
striving for self-perfection is meritorious, but nobody can be blamed for a
lack of effort, because it is too difficult to evaluate this effort. However, vio-
lating the perfect duty of self-preservation is clearly a reason to blame some-
one—at least if he risks his life and his rational and moral capacities
knowingly. Still, as Gunderson points out, risks “can be justifiable when car-
ried out to . . . further one’s ability to act in accord with morally justified
ends” (Gunderson 2007, 93). It remains delicate to detect which side effects
are severe enough and which of them are documented well enough to
uphold the argument of overridingness in practice. Again, the answer
depends on a sober empirical investigation of the strength, the exact quality,
and the frequency of particular risks and side effects.
(3) Concerns about competitive advantage, inequality, and cheating play a
very prominent role in current debates about chemical cognitive enhance-
ment. However, it is unclear how relevant positional advantages and inequal-
ity really are. Given that the access to smart drugs was equally
unproblematic for each student, there would be equal competition. This
would also mean that the competitors would “bear the expenses and other
personal costs . . . without gaining a competitive advantage” (de Grazia
2005, 218).
Thirty-three percent of Ivy League students who admitted to having used
smart drugs in a 2014 U.S. survey did not regard their behavior as cheating
(cf. APA 2014). But other studies show “that lay people have a generally negative
view about enhancement” (Santoni de Sio et al. 2016, 19); just like doping in
sports, the use of drugs instead of mere training and learning is often
regarded as unfair.16 However, chemical enhancement can also be regarded
as a variant of more common techniques of training and learning. According
to a consequentialist view it is clear that though “positional advantage” of
those who use enhancers may “constitute a moral disadvantage of their use,”
it is at the same time “doubtful ethics to deny a benefit to any until it can be
delivered to all” (Harris 2007, 30 and 28).
Many authors who try to mitigate concerns about fairness or cheating hint
at the noncompetitive essence or goal of scholarship and science, often in
comparison to doping in sports.17 They refer to the academic world as a
16 One of the main proponents of this criticism in the philosophical debate is Francis
Fukuyama (2002).
17 Several authors underline that the question of fairness depends on the rules and
purposes of a particular social practice (cf. Roache 2008; Schermer 2008).
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particular social practice with particular rules. But it is a fact that competi-
tion for good results and a successful career do actually play an important
role within this practice. Nevertheless, from a Kantian perspective it is not
decisive whether competition is a part of the academic world, but whether it
is a part of the maxim of the individual agents that interact in that world or
not. “Adopting the maxim” to use enhancers “to obtain a competitive advan-
tage over one’s rivals would be volitionally inconsistent when willed to be
universal law” (Gunderson 2007, 93). It thus conflicts with the first formula
of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.18 Furthermore, a person who strives for
self-perfection in order to fulfill her duty to herself as a person will not form
the maxim of enhancing herself in competition with others. However, this
does not solve the problem that she may still profit from a competitive
advantage and thus foster social inequality.
7. A KANTIAN LESSON
After all, Kant’s theory of self-improvement as an imperfect duty to oneself
does not offer simple answers to the question whether smart drugs are appro-
priate means to the end of self-perfection or to the question of which specific
means would be appropriate. As imperfect duties allow for latitude, the ques-
tion of how the maxims that are formed according to these duties are to be
applied in particular cases has to be answered by casuistry, which is always a
tricky business (cf. Unna 2003, 455). But there is a clear lesson that can be
learned from Kant: a lesson about our maxims or, in other words, about the
high relevance of the attitude, which underlies one’s striving for self-
optimization.
Can concerns about social conformism be attenuated if a student decides
to optimize himself (and chooses means to that end) because he thinks he
owes this to himself and not because of social pressure? There are concerns
that the use of smart drugs in academia can increase “Complicity with Morally
Problematic Social Norms” and foster “Social Quietism” (de Grazia 2005, 215 and
217). Students or researchers who make use of cognitive enhancements for
optimizing their individual performance indirectly support social norms of
high-performance and high-output. Do they just correspond to the human
capacity of “evolutionary adaption” to their environment (Bostrom and
18 This is how Chris Meyers argues (2014). After all, he comes to the conclusion that the
positive influence of the activities of athletes in sports on society, like giving examples of self-
less teamwork and fairness, would be compromised by the use of enhancements and doping,
but “the activities of scientists, scholars, and artists . . . , when successful, provide benefits to
society that do not depend on the means with which their products are produced” (295).
However, this is a consequentialist and not a Kantian argument.
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Sandberg 2009, 324)? The academic environment is not given by nature but
man-made, and it can be modified actively by the social agents who are part
of this environment. If the smart drugs make students and researchers able to
manage their work efficiently and to complete their studies successfully even
under problematic circumstances (like underfinanced universities, bad or
unfair working conditions) they will probably see no reason why they should
try to change those circumstances. It is not self-evident that a student with a
Kantian attitude would be more attentive to problematic social or institu-
tional conditions of his enhanced performance. But if a person understands
that she first of all owes her self-improvement to herself or to the humanity in
herself, but not to others or to society, consistency with social norms will not
be her main motivation. If she decides to enhance her cognitive capacities,
she will do it for herself, treating herself as a person, thus as an end in itself.
Still, Kant does not presuppose a solipsist ideal of self-perfection without
any contribution of the individual person to the goals of society, to “the per-
formance of the group”—or in more Kantian terms to the performance of
humanity. According to Kant it is an imperative to perfect one’s own talents,
because we cannot rationally will a world in which no one does so.19 As
Johnson points out, “the complete perfection of all individual human capacities
would be something left for the totality of humanity to achieve in the fullness
of time,” which means that “the obligation to perfect ourselves is in fact an
obligation to ‘do one’s part’ toward this joint task of humanity as a whole”
(Johnson 2007, 133f). Where then is the difference from the consequentialist
position? Kant refers to utility when he says, “a human being has a duty to
himself to be a useful member of the world,” but he adds: “since this also
belongs to the worth of humanity in his own person, which he ought not to
degrade” (MM VI 446). The individual is not regarded as a part of the sum
of the worth of humanity (or, in Sandberg’s terms, as a part of the positive
sum of the game of academic research). On the contrary, the whole sum of
the worth of humanity is concentrated in each individual human being. It is
the task of each person to align herself towards perfection—to the goal of
unity and completeness of reason (cf. Kleingeld 2017). This goal is inscribed
into her own nature as a rational and potentially reasonable human being.
There is a difference between understanding one’s striving for self-perfection
as a minor contribution to the complete perfection of the totality of humanity
or understanding it as something that one owes to oneself because of being a
human being. The decisive difference of the Kantian perspective on self-
improvement is neither on the means nor on the social practice or culture. It
is the maxim of your individual course of action and the stance that you take
19 Cf. G IV 423 and Johnson 2007, 133.
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up for yourself that makes the difference. Doing what one owes to oneself—
to one’s nature as a human being—can be interpreted as being fair to
oneself. And as the capacity to establish and fulfill duties to oneself is the con-
dition to fulfill duties toward others according to Kant, this is an important
prerequisite of being fair to others.
In Kant’s theory of personality, self-respect—respect toward one’s ratio-
nality, autonomy, and the self-imposed moral law—is most important. Self-
respect [Selbstachtung] is not to be confused with self-love or self-indulgence. It
is positive self-perception that goes hand-in-hand with the experience of mas-
tering one’s inclinations and desires. Moral self-improvement will thus raise a
person’s self-respect. Accordingly, the ways in which someone fulfills his
duties to himself by preserving and improving his nature as well as his moral
capacities can be regarded as “ways in which a person comes to a realization
of his own self-worth” (Paton 1990, 223). This self-worth as a person—one’s
dignity—is the reason why the person has to treat herself (as well as any other
human being) as a person, which means, according to the Formula of
Humanity of the Categorical Imperative [CI 2], never to treat the humanity
in oneself (or others) as a mere means, but always at the same time as an end
(cf. G IV 429). As Thomas Hill points out, “if one respects the moral law,
then one must respect one’s own moral rights” (Hill 1973, 98).
On the basis of these assumptions about one’s relation to one’s own
status as a person, enhancements shall not compromise one’s self-respect.
De Grazia speculates “that if actions of this sort [i.e., enhancements] are
morally problematic, that is because they demonstrate insufficient self-
respect” (de Grazia 2005, 241). A person who feels the need to use chemical
cognitive enhancers could thereby demonstrate that she does not sufficiently
respect her present rational capacities. However, I think it is more problem-
atic that the decision to make use of such enhancers does not already demon-
strate insufficient self-respect, but it can result in a loss of self-respect for one’s
performance.
Is it easier to respect one’s own performance of better learning and think-
ing if it is more truly one’s own achievement, because it is carried out without
the support of chemical enhancers? For Meyers, enhancement is permissible
“as long as the enhancements are only helping practitioners to do their own
work and not doing the work for them” (Meyers 2014, 297). He indirectly
refers to an ideal of authorship, of being the original source of one’s own suc-
cess and one’s academic products. However, he points out that someone who
takes enhancers to write a better book (for example, about Kant) will still
have to write that book. Enhancers do not do the work for the agent. But I
agree to the argument that “there is a grain of truth behind the
responsibility-shifting justification” of the thesis that there should be less
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praise for enhanced performance (Santoni de Sio et al. 2016, 36): The activ-
ity—passing an exam—may still be the activity of the agent; nevertheless, in
many cases we probably need a different description of the activity—passing
an exam without medical aid or under the influence of chemical cognitive
enhancers. At first sight the difference between these activities is analogous to
the difference between the activities of writing and revising a whole book by
hand with an old-fashioned typewriter or with a modern computer. How-
ever, in this case it is a difference within the mental capacities of the agent,
and it thus probably has a greater impact on the way he can see and respect
himself and his own mental activity of learning and thinking. And, further-
more, the degree of self-respect that accompanies these activities again
depends on the maxim of the agent and not only on the means that he uses:
Does he regard his activity of learning and thinking as a mere means to the
end of enhancing his career, of contributing to common goals, or does he
worship these capacities as essential elements of himself being a rational
human being?
Johnson asks: “If there is something suspect about a failure to improve
yourself, is the fault only that you have somehow wronged others in some
way, say, by not being as useful to others as you should be?” (Johnson
2011, 1). From a Kantian point of view the fault is rather that you have
somehow wronged yourself—namely, yourself as a person, who shall not pri-
marily be treated as being useful either for someone else or for society or for
a higher goal—so, “what makes it wrong is that you have failed to respect
your own humanity” (Johnson 2007, 125). In the discussion about the appro-
priateness and status of chemical cognitive self-enhancement, the following
lesson can be learned from Kant: it is crucial not to regard and treat oneself
as a mere means for better output. Understanding self-improvement as a
duty to oneself, as something that each person owes to herself, includes
respecting oneself (and, correspondingly, the other) as a person—who is
capable of development; who is able to develop from within herself; who is
free to decide which means to use or to refuse for her self-improvement; who
shall not be pushed or forced from outside to cultivate and improve herself,
though she may surely be invited and supported to do so. Kant’s duties to
oneself request that one treats oneself as well as any other human being as a
person and thus as an end in itself.20
20 I would like to thank Pauline Kleingeld and other discussants at the Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen as well as Heidi Samuelson and two anonymous reviewers for their very insightful
comments on this paper. I am also grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for
the support of my research about a Kantian perspective on self-enhancement.
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